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Modern economic relationships often take the form that strangers meet randomly to
transact or collaborate, and they can continue the relationship by mutual agreement.
Internet transactions are prominent examples of this sort. Ordinary repeated-game
framework does not apply to such situations because it assumes that players repeat
the same game for certain periods without an option to terminate. Fujiwara-Greve
and Okuno-Fujiwara (2007) (Greve-Okuno henceforth) formulated a new framework
of voluntarily separable repeated game in which one can unilaterally end a partner-
ship and repetition is by mutual agreement only. Focusing on Prisoner’s Dilemma
as the stage game, they investigated evolutionary stability of strategy distributions.
In Greve-Okuno (2007), it was assumed that actions within a partnership is ob-
servable only to the partners, and after a random matching with a new partner they
start from a null history. Related literature (Datta, 1996, Ghosh and Ray, 1996,
and Kranton, 1996) has the same assumption. Under this no-information-ﬂow as-
sumption, the incentive to exploit the partner and escape is the greatest, hence it
is most diﬃcult to sustain cooperation. The literature above are thus mainly con-
cerned with the existence of a cooperative equilibrium and the suﬃcient conditions
for it. Greve-Okuno (2007) showed that there are evolutionary stable distributions
consisting of “trust building strategies”: for certain periods at the beginning of a
new match, players do not cooperate but continue the partnership (these periods are
called “trust building periods”), and after that the players cooperate and keep the
partnership if and only if the partner also cooperated (these periods are called “coop-
eration periods”). Moreover, trust building periods are necessary for any symmetric
(monomorphic) equilibrium.
In this paper we weaken the no-information-ﬂow assumption and postulate that
players can issue a “reference letter” for the partner to bring to the random matching
pool. We assume that a reference letter signals only that it exists and not the details
of the actions within a partnership.1 This partial information can still be useful to
1This can be justiﬁed for example when one can verify a signature but not the actions within
a partnership.
1infer the reason of a partnership dissolution and thus shorten the trust building
periods in a future match. Therefore, an additional information improves eﬃciency.
Such devices are utilized in many parts of the society, and the fundamental idea of
this paper should be useful in economic information policies.
2 Model
Consider a large society of a continuum of players with measure 1. The time is
discrete. At the end of each period, each player exits from the society for an ex-
ogenous reason (which we call a “death”) with probability 1 − δ (0 < δ < 1). If a
player dies, a new player enters the society, keeping the population size constant. In
each period, players without a partner (including the newly born players) enter the
random matching pool and form pairs to play the Voluntarily Separable Repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemma with Reference Letters as follows.
In the matching pool, each player is either with a reference letter (status Y )
or without a reference letter (status N). Assume that a newly born player has
no reference letter.2 Randomly matched players observe whether the new partner
holds a reference letter or not, and thus they can base their future actions on this
observation.
Randomly matched players ﬁrst play the Prisoner’s Dilemma (see Table 1) by
choosing action C or D simultaneously. The actions in the Prisoner’s Dilemma are
observable only by the partners. After that, based on the observation, each player
chooses whether to keep the partnership (action k) or end it (action e) simultane-
ously. If at least one player chooses e, the partnership ends and both players (if they
survive) go to the random matching pool in the next period. If both chose action
k, unless one of them dies, they play the Prisoner’s Dilemma together again in the
next period, skipping the matching process. If the partner dies, the surviving player
goes to the random matching pool in the next period.
The existence of a reference letter is important when one enters the random
2See concluding remark section 5 for a brief discussion of the case when newly born players
have reference letters.
2P1 \ P2 C D
C c, c `, g
D g, ` d, d
Table 1: Prisoner’s Dilemma
matching pool. We assume that players choose whether to issue a reference letter
to the partner at the time of continuation decision.3 That is, each player chooses
whether to keep the partnership or not and also whether to issue a reference letter
(action y) or not (action n) simultaneously. This implies that one decides on the let-
ter issuance based only on the observation of the actions in the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
without knowing if the partner wants to keep the partnership and/or issue a letter
for you. A sequential decision model in which players choose the letter action after
the continuation decision can be analyzed similarly but complicates the exposition,
hence we do not consider it in this paper. Assume that the reference letter is valid
only one period so that the letter status of a player is solely dependent on the most
recent choice of the partner.
The payoﬀ in a period is determined only by the action proﬁle in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, as in Table 1. Assume that g > c > d > ` and 2c = g + `. The latter is
for simplicity and to make the symmetric action proﬁle (C,C) eﬃcient.
The game continues with probability δ from an individual player’s point of view.
Thus we focus on the expected total payoﬀ, with δ being the eﬀective discount factor
of a player.
We assume that the actions within a partnership are observable perfectly between
the partners but not observable by any other player. Therefore newly matched
players have no information about the past actions of each other except the letter
status. It is then natural to consider the following strategies, which use only the
partnership history and the letter status.
Let t = 1,2,... denote the periods in the current partnership. For each t, deﬁne
3Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (2007) consider a model in which reference letters are generated accord-
ing to an exogenous rule, based on actions in the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
3Ht := {Y,N}2 × [{C,D}2 × {y,n}2](t−1) as the set of partnership histories at the
beginning of the t-th period of a partnership. If it is a new match (t = 1), then only
the status of the reference letters is the partnership history.
DEFINITION 1. A pure strategy s speciﬁes the following (xt,yt,zt)∞
t=1.
For each t = 1,2,...,
(a) xt : Ht → {C,D} speciﬁes an action in the Prisoner’s Dilemma;
(b) yt : Ht × {C,D}2 → {k,e} speciﬁes a continuation decision based on the
partnership history and the action proﬁle in the current period;
(c) zt : Ht × {C,D}2 → {y,n} speciﬁes whether to issue a reference letter to the
current partner based on the partnership history and the action proﬁle in the
current period.
Since each partnership starts with only the letter status, a player can use the
same pure strategy in every match.4 Let S be the set of pure strategies and P(S)
be the set of all probability distributions over S. For simplicity, we assume that
each player uses only a pure strategy.
Greve-Okuno (2007) showed that if a symmetric strategy distribution is a Nash
equilibrium, then it must be a strategy that plays D (but keeps the partnership if
(D,D) is observed in the current period) for some initial periods of a partnership,
which is called a trust building strategy. We also focus on this class of strategies,
but since we have additional letter information, we extend the strategy as follows.
DEFINITION 2. For any T : {Y,N}2 → {0,1,2,...}, letter-based T-trust build-
ing strategy (written as cT) speciﬁes the trust building periods based on the letter
status combination q ∈ {Y,N}2 at the time of random matching and the T function
as follows:
4Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994) consider strategies that utilize one’s own past history in
random matching games. It is possible to include such strategies in our analysis, but since the set
of players is a continuum, there is no Nash equilibrium that can start the “contagion of defection”
to sustain cooperation.
4(i) If t 5 T(q), then play D and choose (k,n) for any observation of the action
proﬁle in the Prisoner’s Dilemma in the current period;5
(ii) If t > T(q), then play C and choose (k,y) if and only if (C,C) is observed in
the current period.
3 Payoﬀ Structure and Nash Equilibrium
We consider stability of stationary strategy distributions in the matching pool. Al-
though the strategy distribution in the matching pool may be diﬀerent from the
distribution in the entire society, if the former is stationary, the distribution of vari-
ous states of matches is also stationary, thanks to the stationary death process. (See
Greve-Okuno, 2007.)
When a strategy s ∈ S is matched with another strategy s0 ∈ S, the expected
length of the match is denoted as L(s,s0) and is computed as follows. Notice that
even if s and s0 intend to maintain the match, it will only continue with probability
δ2. Suppose that the planned length of the partnership of s and s0 is T(s,s0) periods,
if no death occurs. Then
L(s,s
0) := 1 + δ
2 + δ
4 + ··· + δ
2{T(s,s0)−1} =
1 − δ2T(s,s0)
1 − δ2 .
The expected total discounted value of the payoﬀ stream of s within the match
with s0 is denoted as V (s,s0). The average per period payoﬀ that s expects to receive









Next we show the structure of the lifetime and average payoﬀ of a player endowed
with strategy s ∈ S in the matching pool, waiting to be matched randomly with
a partner. When a strategy distribution in the matching pool is p ∈ P(S) and is
5If players issue a reference letter during the trust building periods, a trust building strategy
does not become a best reply to itself, because a strategy that chooses D for one period, receive a
reference letter, and then enter the matching pool to exploit the next partner earns a higher total
payoﬀ.
5stationary, we write the expected total discounted value of payoﬀ streams s expects
to receive during his lifetime as V (s;p) and the average per period payoﬀ s expects




= (1 − δ)V (s;p),
where L = 1 + δ + δ2 + ··· = 1
1−δ is the expected lifetime of s.
Thanks to the stationary distribution in the matching pool, we can write V (s;p)
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where supp(p) is the support of the distribution p, the sum δ(1 − δ){1 + δ2 +
··· + δ2{T(s,s0)−2}} is the probability that s loses the partner s0 before T(s,s0), and
δ2{T(s,s0)−1}δ is the probability that the match continued until T(s,s0) and s survives
at the end of T(s,s0) and goes back to the matching pool. Thanks to the stationarity
of p, the continuation payoﬀ after a match ends for any reason is always V (s;p).
Let L(s;p) :=
P

































where the ratio L(s,s0)/L(s;p) is the relative length of periods that s expects to
spend in a match with s0. This nonlinearity is the important characteristics of the
voluntarily separable game and is due to the endogenous duration of partnerships.
Note also that, if p is a strategy distribution consisting of a single strategy s0, then
v(s;p) = v(s,s0).
6DEFINITION 3. Given a stationary strategy distribution in the matching pool p ∈
P(S), s ∈ S is a best reply against p if for all s0 ∈ S,
v(s;p) ≥ v(s
0;p),
and is denoted as s ∈ BR(p).
DEFINITION 4. A stationary strategy distribution in the matching pool p ∈ P(S)
is a Nash equilibrium if, for all s ∈ supp(p), s ∈ BR(p).
4 Eﬃciency Improvement by Reference Letters
In Greve-Okuno (2007), the information regarding past partnerships was completely
lacking for newly formed matches. Thus they focused on strategies that starts from
the null history for each new match and derived equilibria. They showed that in
any symmetric Nash equilibrium, the players must build trust, i.e., play D for some
initial periods of any new match. This is to impose cost on newly formed matches
to make a long-term cooperative relationship valuable, since the players cannot
distinguish the past of others.
By contrast, in our model, players can choose diﬀerent continuation strategies
depending on the letter status of the new partner. Therefore we investigate whether
we can reduce the trust-building periods to zero for (Y,Y )-pair of players. If that
holds in an equilibrium, the sheer existence of reference letter improves the eﬃciency
of the society, although the contents of the letter is irrelevant.
Below we focus on a particular T-function such that T(Y,Y ) = 0 and T(q) = T
for any q 6= (Y,Y ) for some integer T = 1 and ﬁnd a suﬃcient condition (depending
on T) for a symmetric strategy distribution consisting of cT-strategy to be a Nash
equilibrium.
4.1 Distribution in the Matching Pool
In this subsection we derive a unique stationary distribution of Y and N status
players in the matching pool, which is consistent with the stationary cT-strategy
7δ 1 − δ
δ keep Y , N
1 − δ N, Y N, N
Table 2: Patterns and probabilities of players entering the matching pool from a
Y Y -pair or a pair after trust building
distribution. Let the measure of players in the matching pool be 1 and the fraction
of Y -status players be α. This α must satisfy a certain equality under the stationary
strategy distribution of cT.
By the random matching process, the fraction of pairs of players such that both
have reference letters, (called a Y Y -pair) is 1
2α2. The fraction of pairs in which
exactly one player has a reference letter (called a NY -pair) is α(1 − α), since there
are two ways that a pair is of this form. The fraction of pairs in which none has a
reference letter (called a NN-pair) is 1
2(1 − α)2. The probability that these pairs
continue for t periods is the probability that both players survive (with probability
δ2) for t consecutive periods. Thus, the fraction of Y Y -pairs that continued for t
periods is 1
2α2δ2t, that of NY -pairs that continued for t periods is α(1 − α)δ2t, and
that of NN-pairs that continued for t periods is 1
2(1 − α)2δ2t.
At a point of time, these pairs with t = 1,2,3,... periods of duration co-exist
in the society. The total fraction of Y Y -pairs is 1
2α2{1 + δ2 + ···}. Among these,
those who go back to the matching pool are the ones that the partner died, since
cT-strategy prescribes that matched players issue reference letters to each other in
every period of the partnership. The probability of exactly one player dies in a
partnership is δ(1 − δ) and there are two cases. (See Table 2.) Therefore, the
fraction of Y-status players entering the matching pool from YY-pairs is





2 + ···} =
δ(1 − δ)α2
1 − δ2 .
Dead players in YY-pairs will generate newly born players with N status in the
matching pool. The probability that exactly one player dies is 2δ(1 − δ) and the
probability that both die is (1−δ)2. Hence the fraction of N-status players entering
8during TB δ 1 − δ
δ keep N, N
1 − δ N, N N, N
during CP δ 1 − δ
δ keep Y , N
1 − δ N, Y N, N
Table 3: Patterns and probabilities of players entering the matching pool from NY
or NN-pairs
the matching pool from YY-pairs is






2 + ···} =
(1 − δ)α2
1 − δ2 .
Next, consider players going to the matching pool from NY-pairs or NN-pairs.
The fraction of these types of pairs is α(1 − α) + 1
2(1 − α)2. From these types of
pairs, during the trust building periods (t 5 T), two N-status players are generated
in the matching pool regardless of the reason of dissolution, and no Y-status player is
generated. Let N(q;TB) be the fraction of N-status players entering the matching
pool from q 6= (Y,Y )-pairs during their trust-building periods. It is expressed as
N(q;TB) := 2(1 − δ





2 + ··· + δ
2(T−1)}
=
(1 − δ2)(1 − α2)(1 − δ2T)
1 − δ2 .
After the trust building periods, the fraction of Y-status players and N-status
players entering the matching pool are the same as those from YY-pairs. (See Table
3.) Let Y (q;CP) be the fraction of Y -players entering the matching pool from
cooperation periods for q 6= (Y,Y ). It is expressed as








δ(1 − δ)(1 − α2)δ2T
1 − δ2 ,
The fraction of newly born players (with N-status) from q 6= (Y,Y ) pairs during the
cooperation periods is
N(q;CP) := {2δ(1 − δ) + 2(1 − δ)








(1 − δ)(1 − α2)δ2T
1 − δ2 .
9In total, the overall fraction of Y -status players entering the matching pool is
Y (Y,Y ) + Y (q;CP) =
δ{δ2T + α2(1 − δ2T)}
1 + δ
=: f(α).
If there exists α ∈ (0,1) such that f(α) = α, that is the stationary fraction. Since f
is a continuous, monotone-increasing function of α and 0 < f(0) = δ2T+1
1+δ < f(1) =
δ
1+δ < 1, by the Mean-Value Theorem, such α uniquely exists. (It is easy to check
that this α also satisﬁes N(Y,Y )+N(q;TB)+N(q;CP) = 1−α.) In summary we
have the following lemma.
LEMMA 1. For any δ ∈ (0,1) and any T, there exists a unique α ∈ (0,1) which
makes the stationary strategy distribution of cT-strategies consistent with the ﬂow of
players over time.
In the following we assume this α as the fraction of Y -status players in the
matching pool.
4.2 Expected Payoﬀ
Let us write the total expected payoﬀ of a player who is just randomly matched
with another player as V (Y,Y ) and V (q) (q 6= (Y,Y )), depending on the letter
status combination of the newly formed pair. These values must satisfy the following
system of simultaneous equations. First, if they start as a Y Y -pair, the player gets
a reference letter in any period and thus the recursive equation is as follows.
V (Y,Y ) =
c
1 − δ2 + δ(1 − δ)(1 + δ
2 + ···)[(1 − α)V (q) + αV (Y,Y )]
=
c
1 − δ2 +
δ(1 − δ)
1 − δ2 [(1 − α)V (q) + αV (Y,Y )]. (4)
Second, consider the case when the player started in an NY or NN-pair. During
the trust building periods, if the partner dies the player goes back to the matching
pool without the reference letter and thus V (q) is the continuation payoﬀ. After the
trust building periods, the continuation payoﬀ is the same (1 − α)V (q) + αV (Y,Y )
10as that of a player starting from a Y Y -pair. Hence,
V (q) =
1 − δ2T
1 − δ2 d
+δ(1 − δ)(1 + δ







2(T+1) + ···)[(1 − α)V (q) + αV (Y,Y )]
=
1 − δ2T
1 − δ2 d +
δ(1 − δ)(1 − δ2T)
1 − δ2 V (q)
+
δ2T
1 − δ2c +
δ(1 − δ)δ2T
1 − δ2 [(1 − α)V (q) + αV (Y,Y )]. (5)
Solving (4) and (5) simultaneously, we explicitly obtain
V (Y,Y ) =
c(1 + δ2T+1) + (1 − α)δ(1 − δ2T)d
(1 − δ){1 + δ − αδ(1 − δ2T)}
(6)
V (q) =
δ2T(1 + δ)c + {1 + (1 − α)δ}(1 − δ2T)d
(1 − δ){1 + δ − αδ(1 − δ2T)}
(7)
It is straightforward to show that V (Y,Y ) > V (q). Also, notice that a newly
born player has N status and thus each player’s lifetime expected payoﬀ is V (q).
4.3 Nash Equilibrium
Let us ﬁnd a condition of T that the symmetric strategy distribution of cT constitutes
a Nash equilibrium. By the dynamic programming, it is suﬃcient to show that no
strategy that diﬀer from cT in one step obtains a strictly better payoﬀ.
First, consider one-step deviations during the trust building periods. If a player
started in a non-Y Y -pair, the partners are supposed to play (D,D) for the ﬁrst T
periods. During this time no one-step deviation would earn a higher payoﬀ than
cT’s.
Second, consider one-step deviations to play D in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, when
a player started in a Y Y -pair or after trust building periods, so that the partner
is expected to play C. Such one-step deviation earns g in this period and receive
no reference letter so that the continuation payoﬀ is V (q). Thus the total payoﬀ is
g + δV (q). By contrast, the payoﬀ of cT-strategy is
c
1 − δ2 +
δ(1 − δ)
1 − δ2 [(1 − α)V (q) + αV (Y,Y )].
11To explain, the ﬁrst term c
1−δ2 is the total payoﬀ within the current partnership
which continues with probability δ2. If the partner dies, there are two cases of
continuation payoﬀs. One possibility is that you meet an N-player in the matching
pool, with probability (1 − α), in which case the continuation payoﬀ is V (q). The
other possibility is that you meet a Y -player with probability α, in which case the
continuation payoﬀ is V (Y,Y ) since you have a reference letter. Therefore, the
condition that the one-step deviations do not earn higher payoﬀ is
g + δV (q) 5
c
1 − δ2 +
δ(1 − δ)
1 − δ2 [(1 − α)V (q) + αV (Y,Y )]. (8)
Third, one-step deviations to choose e when it is supposed to choose k has the
continuation payoﬀ of V (q) during the trust building periods and (1 − α)V (q) +
αV (Y,Y ) during the cooperation periods. During the trust building periods, cT
strategy’s continuation payoﬀ is at least (when there are T − 1 periods of trust
building remains)
V (q;T − 1) :=
1 − δ2(T−1)
1 − δ2 d +
δ(1 − δ)(1 − δ2(T−1))
1 − δ2 V (q)
+
δ2(T−1)
1 − δ2 c +
δ(1 − δ)δ2(T−1)
1 − δ2 [(1 − α)V (q) + αV (Y,Y )]
> V (q).
During the cooperation periods, the continuation payoﬀ of cT-strategy is V (Y,Y ),
which is clearly greater than (1 − α)V (q) + αV (Y,Y ).
Finally, consider one-step deviations to choose a diﬀerent letter decision than cT
prescribes. This deviation does not change the player’s payoﬀ and thus there is no
incentive to do so.
In summary, the suﬃcient condition for the symmetric strategy distribution of






1 − δ2 +
δ
1 − δ2[(1 − α)v(q) + αv(Y,Y )]. (9)
Now we compare T that satisﬁes (9) with the minimum trust building periods
of τ(δ) for the model without reference letters (Greve-Okuno, 2007). With no in-
formation ﬂow, the continuation payoﬀ right after a partnership dissolution is the
12same regardless of the cause of the dissolution, which is also the total expected
payoﬀ at the time of entering the matching pool, i.e., one’s lifetime payoﬀ. Let this
be V NL and the average lifetime payoﬀ of the no-information-ﬂow model be vNL.6
The suﬃcient condition to prevent deviation to play D after trust building periods,




1 − δ2 +
δ(1 − δ)












Let vBR be the upper bound to vNL that satisﬁes (10), i.e., vBR satisﬁes (10) with
equality. Greve-Okuno (2007) shows that for any δ ∈ (δ,1) (for some δ > 0 deﬁned
in Greve-Okuno, 2007), there exists the minimum trust building periods τ(δ) < ∞
that warrants vNL(cτ(δ)) 5 vBR. Since v(q) < (1 − α)v(q) + αv(Y,Y ), (9) is also
satisﬁed by τ(δ)-trust building strategy with reference letters. Thus we have the
following existence result.
PROPOSITION 1. For any δ ∈ (δ,1) (where δ > 0 is deﬁned in Greve-Okuno, 2007),
there exists the minimum T = τ(δ) such that the letter-based T-trust building strategy
is a Nash equilibrium.7
Moreover, v(q) < (1 − α)v(q) + αv(Y,Y ) implies that the upper bound of v(q)
that warrants (9) is strictly greater than vBR. This implies that the sheer existence
of reference letter improved the eﬃciency.
PROPOSITION 2. The highest equilibrium average payoﬀ under the letter-based trust
building strategy is strictly greater than that of the trust building strategy without
reference letters.
5 Concluding Remarks
We analyzed the role of reference letters in voluntarily separable repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma. During the cooperation periods, if both partners cooperated they issue
6NL stands for No Letter.
7Clearly, letter-based trust-building strategies with longer trust building periods for non-Y Y -
pairs are also equilibria.
13reference letters to each other, and, in the matching pool, those with reference letters
can start cooperation right away. We derived a necessary and suﬃcient condition for
such strategy combination to be a Nash equilibrium and showed that this equilibrium
has average payoﬀ greater than any symmetric equilibrium in the no information
ﬂow model. Therefore the sheer existence of reference letters, which only signals the
cause of partnership dissolution, improves the eﬃciency.
In this paper we assumed that newly born players do not have a reference let-
ter, but an analogous result obtains when newly born players are assumed to have
reference letters. Moreover, if newly born players have reference letters, on the equi-
librium path, all players entering the matching pool have the reference letters. This
strengthens the incentive to cooperate, because one can start in a Y Y -pair always
in the matching pool, unless one deviates. Hence eﬃciency is even more improved.
In reality, diplomas, transcripts, and recommendation letters from college or high
school can be interpreted as a reference letter. If these are considered to be credible
evidence of the quality of a new employee by the society, initial trust building peri-
ods can be signiﬁcantly shortened. By contrast, if the society do not respect these,
not only the payoﬀ of new employees but also the one for the society reduces.
We focused on strategies such that if a player with a reference letter met a
player without a reference letter, they start with trust building. It is possible that
in that case one wants to “skip” this match and wait for a match with a player with
a reference letter so that they can start the cooperation periods right away. If a
player chooses to stay in the matching pool for more than the transition time, the
model can include the unemployment. By the logic of the eﬃciency wage theory,8
the possibility of unemployment serves as a disciplining device. This is an interesting
future research direction.
8See Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) and Okuno-Fujiwara (1987).
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